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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
v. 
RICHARD HAYES, 
                           Appellant 
      
 
On Appeal from the District Court  
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(District Court No.: 2-11-cr-00069-001) 
District Judge:   Honorable Terrence F. McVerry 
      
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
on November 17, 2014 
 
Before:  RENDELL, JORDAN and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: March 27, 2015) 
 
   
 
O P I N I O N* 
   
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge, 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Appellant Richard Hayes appeals from the District Court a denial of his Motion to 
Suppress Evidence of a mailed package containing marijuana.  The seizure of this 
package led the authorities to discover another package containing cocaine, and upon 
such discovery, Hayes was charged with conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent 
to distribute 500 grams or more of a mixture and substance containing a detectable 
amount of cocaine.   
 Hayes appeals on the basis that a postal service worker’s removal of a package 
from the mailstream to inspect it was not supported by reasonable suspicion, and once 
removed from the mailstream, the amount of time it took for the package to arrive at its 
destination was not reasonable and therefore, constituted an unreasonable seizure. 
 Hayes contends that because the postal service worker had no personal knowledge 
of the smell of raw marijuana, and her only knowledge of the smell of burnt marijuana 
from a college party she attended over 30 years ago, her suspicions of the package did not 
amount to the reasonable suspicion necessary to remove the package from the 
mailstream.  Hayes also contends that as a result of this removal, the package did not 
arrive at its final destination for another four days, which was an unreasonable delay and 
therefore constituted an illegal seizure.   
A. Reasonable Suspicion to Remove Package from Mail Stream for Inspection
 Petitioner argues that Kathleen Wells, the postal service worker who was on duty 
at the time his package was removed from the mailstream for inspection, did not have the 
reasonable suspicion required to do so.  He points out that Wells lacked the knowledge to 
detect the smell of raw marijuana based on her memory of the odor of burnt marijuana 
 3 
 
approximately 30 years ago at a college party she attended.  He also asserts that the 
Postal Service Inspector on duty, Steven Celletti, erred in failing to inquire about Wells’ 
experience and qualifications in being able to identify raw marijuana before he instructed 
her to keep the package secure overnight, thereby keeping it out of the mailstream.  
 Postal authorities may seize and detain mailed items for a reasonable amount of 
time, if they have a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.  United States v. Van 
Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249, 251-52 (1970).  Reasonable suspicion that a mail parcel contains 
contraband for purposes of temporary detention is evaluated under a totality of the 
circumstances standard.  United States v. Colon, 386 F. App’x 229, 230-31 (3d Cir. 
2010). 
 Petitioner’s arguments that Wells and Celletti lacked reasonable suspicion are 
unavailing.  First, “the smell of marijuana alone, if articulable and particularized, may 
establish not merely reasonable suspicion, but probable cause.”  United States v. Ramos, 
443 F.3d 304, 308 (3d Cir. 2006).  Several postal employees handling mail on the floor at 
the time Petitioner’s mail was removed from the mailstream smelled marijuana coming 
from the package, as it had come partly open in transit.  They notified Wells, the postal 
service worker on duty, of the smell.  She approached the package, and also smelled what 
she believed to be marijuana.  She contacted Celletti, who instructed her to keep the 
package overnight.  He inspected the package the next morning, and identified the odor 
emanating from it as marijuana.  This smell, as identified by several individuals who 
handled the package, on its own established the reasonable suspicion necessary to remove 
the package from the mailstream. 
 4 
 
 However, many other factors, taken in totality, pointed to the existence of 
reasonable suspicion here.  In Van Leeuwen, the Court upheld the authorities’ detention 
of a package because they had reasonable suspicion based on: (1) the nature and weight 
of the packages; (2) the fictitious return address on the packages; and (3) the foreign 
license plates of the person placing the packages into the mail.  397 U.S. at 252.  Several 
facts, as observed by Wells, Celletti and Brian Plants, Celletti’s colleague, establish 
reasonable suspicion here: (1) multiple individuals believed the package smelled like 
marijuana, (2) its contents were wrapped in a black plastic bag, also an indicator of a 
narcotics shipment, (3) it contained scented dryer sheets, typically used by narcotics 
traffickers to mask the smell from canines, (4) the package contained a California source 
address, a known source of narcotics, and (5) no known individual by the name on the 
parcel was known to reside at the destination address.  But, specifically in response to 
Hayes’s argument that Wells did not have reasonable suspicion to take the package out of 
the mailstream in the first place, the fact that she and others who handled the package 
believed that it smelled like marijuana was, by itself, sufficient to establish the requisite 
reasonable suspicion. 
 Petitioner objects to Celletti’s reliance on Wells’ belief that she smelled marijuana 
in the package in his decision to instruct her to hold the package overnight before he 
could verify the smell.  The Government is correct, however, that Wells’ role could be 
analogized to that of a known informant, whose tip provided a law enforcement officer 
such as Celletti with sufficient information to establish reasonable suspicion.  United 
States v. Torres, 534 F.3d 207, 211 (3d Cir. 2008).  Under Torres, this Court evaluates an 
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informant’s credibility by examining (1) whether the tip was relayed face-to-face such 
that the officer had the opportunity to appraise the witness’s credibility through 
observation, (2) the person providing the tip can be held responsible if her allegations 
turn out to be fabricated, (3) the content of the tip is not information that would be 
available to any observer, (4) and the person providing the information has recently 
witnessed the alleged criminal activity, and (5) the tip predicts what will follow, which 
allows the police a means to test the informant’s knowledge or credibility.  534 F.3d at 
211.  All but one of these factors weigh in favor of Wells’ credibility, and therefore 
validate Celletti’s decision to trust her observations. 
B. Length of Delay in Retaining Package Was Reasonable 
 Petitioner objects to the four-day delay in the delivery of the parcel to its 
destination address as an unreasonable seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment.  
The temporary detention of packages for purposes of investigation does not run afoul of 
the Fourth Amendment provided there is reasonable suspicion.  Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 
at 251.  Van Leeuwen held a 29-hour delay reasonable due to the reasons for the delay—
the suspicious nature of the packages and the difficulty in contacting a distant recipient 
address for one of them.  Id. at 253.  In United States v. Golson this Court held a four-day 
delay not to be unreasonable where the delay was due in part to “investigation, scheduled 
leave, and the weekend.”  743 F.3d 44, 55 (3d Cir. 2014).  The delay in delivering the 
parcel in Petitioner’s case was also due to investigation, an extended holiday weekend, 
and the unavailability of the Duty Magistrate Judge to provide a warrant when offices 
opened on the Tuesday after the long weekend.  Therefore, it was not unreasonably long. 
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 Petitioner is correct that “in assessing the effect of the length of the detention, we 
take into account whether the police diligently pursue their investigation.”  United States 
v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709 (1983).  Defendant argues that Celletti’s one-day delay in 
arriving at the mail distribution center to examine the package, his handing off the 
investigation to Plants, and Plants’ lack of effort to obtain a warrant over the holiday 
weekend evinced lack of diligence and unreasonably prolonged the warrantless seizure of 
the package.  These facts do not demonstrate a lack of diligence.  Celletti inspected the 
package in person the morning after its discovery in the mailstream because he knew that 
the steps necessary to either release the package for delivery or engage in a controlled 
delivery with law enforcement could not be accomplished that evening.  After verifying 
that the package smelled like marijuana, Celletti handed the investigation to Plants due to 
Celletti’s heavy workload.  Plants reinstated the investigation as soon as he was back 
from the weekend, and obtained a warrant the next day, the earliest that the Magistrate 
Judge was available to issue one.  This case is hardly a situation, as Defendant suggests, 
where law enforcement officials obtained a search warrant “at their leisure”.  United 
States v. Dass, 849 F.2d 414, 415 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding that 7 to 23 days of delay in 
seeking warrants after removing packages from the mail was unreasonable).   
CONCLUSION 
 For the reasons stated above, we affirm the District Court’s ruling. 
